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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-seventies the equilibrium existence results of Nash [16] and 
Debreu [3] were generalized in two main directions: The first 
generalization was due to Schmeidler [19] and allowed for an atomless 
measure space of agents. This extension was important as it captured the 
meaning of “negligible” agents which is an inherent element of cometitive 
theory. The second generalization was due to Shafer and Sonnenschein 
[20] and was inspired by a theorem of Mas-Cole11 [ 141 which ‘allowed for 
a more general class of agents’ preferences. In particular, in this approach, 
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agents’ preferences need nt be transitive or complete and therefore may slot 
be representable by utility functions. This extension was of great impor- 
tance since empirical evidence indicates that agents do not always make 
transitive choices. 
Recently the work of Schmeidler [19] has been generalized by K 
[7, X]. In particular, Khan has allowed the dimensionality of the strategy 
space to be infinite. This extension is of great importance since infinite 
dimensional spaces arise very naturally in several situations. The p 
of this paper is to present an equilibrium existence theorem 
simultaneously allows (i) the dimensionality of the strategy space to be 
infinite, (ii) the set of agents to be a measure space, and (iii) for agents’ 
preferences which need not be ordered.’ 
We believe that our equilibrium result is economically interesting for two 
main teasons. First it proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a quite 
general setting, and second it may become a useful technical tool in 
proving the existence of competitive quilibria in economies with a measure 
space of agents and with infinitely many commodities.2 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation an 
definitions. Our main equilibrium existence theorem is stated in Section 3 
and Section 4 contains the proof of this theorem. 
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
2.1. Notation 
2A denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A, 
R denotes the set of real numbers, 
con A denotes the convex hull of the set A, 
cl A denotes the norm closure of the set A, 
\ denotes the set theoretic subtraction, 
If 4: X-t 2 ’ is a correspondence then 4 / U: U + 2 ’ demotes t 
tion of fj to U. 
2.2. Definitions 
Let X, Y be two topological spaces. A correspondence 4: X-+ 2’ is said 
to be upper-semicontinuous (USC) if the set {x E X: d(x) c Vj is open in % 
’ Khan and Papageorgiou [lo] and Yannelis [22] have proved a related result. However, 
in both papers the measurability and continuity assumptions are different from ours and ncme 
of these results implies the other. It is important, however, to note that these differences in 
assumptions necessitate intricate mathematical arguments quite different from theirs. For a 
complete comparison between the above papers as well as related work by others see 
Yannelis [ZZ]. 
2 See Yannelis [22, Remark 6.5, p. 1091 for a further discussion of this point. 
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for every open subset V of Y. The graph of the correspondence 4: X -+ 2 ’ is 
denoted by G, = {(x, y) E Xx Y: y E 4(x)}. The correspondence 4: X+ 2’ 
is said to have an open graph if the set G, is open in Xx Y. A correspon- 
dence 4 : X + 2 ’ is said to have open lower sections if for each y E Y the set 
d-‘(y)= (XEX y E d(x)} is open in X. Let (T, z, p) be a complete finite 
measure space; i.e., p is a real-valued, non-negative, countably additive 
measure defined in a complete o-field r of subsets of T such that p(T) < co 
and let X be a Banach space. L,(u, X) denotes the space of equivalence 
classes of X-valued Bochner integrable functions f: T--t X normed by 
llfll =s, Ilf(t)ll 44t). 
A correspondence 4: T -+2X is said to be integrably bounded if there exists 
a map gg L,(p) such that for almost all t E T, sup{ /JxIj : x E d(t)} 6 g(t). 
The correspondence 4: T + 2x is said to have a measurable graph if 
G, E r @B(X), where ,9(X) denotes the Bore1 a-algebra on X and @ 
denotes the o-product algebra. 
We shall also need the notion of a separable measure space. To introduce 
this, recall that the measure algebra M of (T, r, ,u) is the factor algebra of r 
modulo the p-null sets. M is a metric space with the distance given by the 
measure of the symmetric difference. We call the measure space (T, z, p) 
separable if M is separable. A well-known theorem of Caratheodory states 
that all separable atomless measure spaces have isomorphic measure 
algebras (see for instance Royden [ 18, p. 321, Theorem 23 ). It is easy to see 
that (T, r, ,u) is separable if and only if there is a countable subalgebra z” of 
r (z” is not a a-algebra unless finite) such that the factor algebra of ? 
modulo the null sets is dense in M. Standard arguments show that 
functions which are simple relative to z” and take values in a countable 
dense subset of a separable Banach space Y are dense in L,(u, Y); thus 
L1(u, Y) is separable if (T, r, p) is (see for instance Kolmogorov and 
Fomin [13, p. 3811). 
Finally, let Z be a topological space and let 4 : TX Z + 2’ be a non- 
empty valued correspondence. A function f: T x Z + Y is said to be a 
Caratheodory-type selection from 4 if f(t, z) E q5(t, z) for all (1, z) E TX Z 
and f (-, z) is measurable for all z E Z and f( t, .) is continuous for all t E T. 
A Caratheodory-type selection existence theorem needed for the proof of 
our main theorem is given in [ 111, and it is stated below. 
CARAT&• DORY-TYPE SELECTION THEOREM. Let (T, z,,u) be a complete 
measure space, let Y be a separable Banach space, and let Z be a 
complete separable metric space. Let X: T + 2’ be a correspondence with a 
measurable graph, i.e., G, E z @ B( Y), and let 4: T x Z + 2’ be a convex 
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valued correspondence (possibly empty) with a ,~eas~~~b~e graph; i.e., 
G, E z @99(Z) @ 98( Y) where g(Y) and .9(Z) are the Bore! a-algebras of Y 
and Z, respectively. Furthermore suppose that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) 
below hold: 
(i) for each teT, &t,x)CX(t)for alZxEZ. 
(ii) for each t, qS( t, .) has open lower sections in Z; i.e., for each TV T 
andeach YE Y, &“(t, y)= (xEZ: yEq5(t,x)) is open in Z. 
(iii) for each (t, x) E T x Z, if q5( t, x) # @, then d( t, x) has a non-empty 
interior in X(t). 
Let LJ={(t,x)~TxZ:q5(t,x)#@} and for each FEZ, U,=(~ET: 
(t, x) E U} and for each t E T, U’= {x E Z: (t, x) E U>. Then for each x E Z 
U, is a measurable set in T and there exists a Carath~odory-type selection 
from 4 1 o; i.e., there exists a function f : U+ Y such that f(t, x) E #(t, x) for 
all (t, x) E LJ and for each x E Z, f ( ., x) is measurable on U, and for each 
t E T, f (t, .) is continuous on U’. Moreover, f ( ., . ) is jointly measurable. 
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEQREM 
3.1. The Main Result 
Throughout the paper (T, r, ,u) will be a finite, positive, complete, and 
separable measure space of agents. Let Y be a separable Banach space. For 
any correspondence X: T-+2Y, L,(u, X) will denote the set (x~Lr(p, Y): 
x(t) E X(t) for almost all t in T}. We now define the notion of an abstract 
economy as follows: 
An abstract economy r is a quadruple [(T, r, p), X, F, A], where 
(1) (T, z, p) is a measure space of agents; 
(2) X: T -+ 2 ’ is a strategy correspondence; 
(3) P: T x L,(u, X) + 2 ’ is a preference correspondence such that 
P(t, x) c X(t) for all (t, x) E TX L,(,u, X); 
(4) A : TX L1(pL, X) -+ 2’ is a constraint correspondence such that 
A(t, x)c X(t) for all (t, x) E TX L,(u, X). 
Notice that since P is a mapping from TX L,(p, X) to 2’, we have 
allowed for interdependent preferences. Roughly speaking the inter- 
pretation of these preference correspondences i that y E P(t, x) means that 
agent t strictly prefers y to x(t) if the given strategies of other agents are 
fixed. For a more detailed discussion of the interpretation of these 
preference correspondences see Khan [S]. Notice that preferences need not 
be transitive or complete and therefore need not be representable by uthty 
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functions. However, it will be assumed that x(t) C$ con P(t, x) for all 
x E L,(p, X) and for almost all t in T, which implies that x(t) $ P( t, x) for 
all x E L,(,u, X) and almost all t in T; i.e., P(t, .) is irrej7exiue for almost all 
t in T. 
An equilibrium for r is an x* E L,(/J, X) such that for almost all t in T 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) x*(t) Eel A(t, x*), and 
(ii) P(t, x*) n cl A(t, x*) = 0. 
We can now state the assumptions needed for the proof of the main 
theorem. 
(A.l) X: T + 2’ is an integrably bounded correspondence with a 
measurable graph such that for all t E T, X(t) is a non-empty, convex, and 
weakly compact subset of Y. 
(A.2) A : TX L,(p, X) + 2’ is a correspondence such that: 
(a) {C&x, Y)ETx&(P,X)X Y: yEA(t,x)}EZO~~(Ll(lu,X))O~(Y) 
where 9Q(L,(~, X)) is the Bore1 a-algebra for the weak topology on 
L,(,u, X) and a(Y) is the Bore1 o-algebra for the norm topology on K 
(b) it has weakly open lower sections, i.e., for each t E T and for each 
YEY, the set K’(t,y)={xEL,(p,X):yEA(t,x)} is weakly open in 
Lb4 n 
(c) for all (t, x) E T x L,(p, X), A(t, x) is convex and has a non-empty 
interior in the relative norm topology of X(t)‘; 
(d) for each t E T, the correspondence A( t, . ) : L,(p, X) + 2 ‘, defined 
by A(t, x) = cl A(t, x) for all (t, x) E TX L,(/L, X), is USC in the sense that 
the set {x~Lr(,n, X):A(t, x)c V} is weakly open in I,,@, X) for every 
norm open subset V of Y. 
(A.3) P: TX Lr(,n, X) + 2’ is a correspondence such that: 
(a) {(t,x,y)ETxL1(~,X)xY:yEconP(t,x)}EZO,(L1(~,X))O 
g’( n 
(b) it has weakly open lower sections, i.e., for each t E T and each 
YE Y, P-‘(t, y)= {x~L~(p, X): ye P(t, x)> is weakly open in L,(p, X); 
(c) for all (t, x) E TX L,(p, X), P(t, x) is norm open in X(t); 
(d) x(t) 4 con P( t, x) for all x E L,(p, X) and for almost all t in T. 
3 Observe that assumption (A.~)(c) is quite mild. It is implied for instance by the fact that 
for all (t, X)E TX L,(p, X), A(t, x) is open in the relative norm topology of X(t). It is obvious 
that this assumption has nothing to do with whether or not the positive cone of Y has a non- 
empty norm interior. 
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MAIN EXISTENCE THEOREM. Let r= [(T, z, p), A’, P, A] be an abstract 
economy satisfying (A.1 )-(A.3). Then r has an eq~i~~bri~rn. 
3.2. Discussion of the Weak Topology on L,(p, X) 
It may be instructive to discuss assumptions (A.3)(b) and (c). In par- 
ticular, having the weak topology on L,(p, X), which is the set of all joint 
strategies, signifies a natural form of myopic behavior on the part of the 
agents Namely, an agent has to arrive at his decisions on the basis of 
knowledge of only finitely many (average) numerical characteristics of the 
joint strategies. However, there is no a priori upper bound on how many of 
these (average) numerical characteristics of the joint strategies an agent 
might seek in order to arrive at his decision. On the othe hand, since eat 
agent’s strategy set is endowed with the norm topology this may be inter- 
preted as signifying a very high degree of ability to discriminate between 
his own options. Of course, the agent’s decisions depend on both of these 
observations, i.e., the ones of joint strategies made in the sense of the weak 
topology, as well as his own options made with reference IS the norm 
topology. 
Although our choice of the weak topology on Ll(p, X) was disctated 
mathematical considerations (this is the only setting in which we are 
to obtain a positive result), this setting see.ms to be more realistic 
the one with a norm topology on L,(p, X). ‘This latter setting would 
correspond to an extremely high degree of knowledge of the joint strategy 
on the part of each individual agent. However, in this latter setting, 
means of a counterexample, we show that one cannot expect an 
equilibrium to exist. 
3.3. An Example of Non-Existence of Equilibrium 
As was remarked in Section 3.2, having the weak topology on L,(p, X’) 
was the only setting in which we were able to obtain a positive result. 
now show that if we relax (A.3)(b) to the assumption t 
open lower sections then our existence result fails. 
EXAMPLE 3.1. Consider an abstract economy with one agent, Let 
Y = 1,, where I, is the space of square summable real sequences. Denote by 
1: the positive cone of I,. Let the strategy set X be equal to 
(zd: : /jz// < l}. Ob viously X is convex and weakly compact, (reca 
Alaoglu’s theorem). 
Let x = (x,, x1, x2, . ..) E X, and let f: X -+ X be a norm continuous map- 
ping which does not have the fixed point property (for instance, let f(x) = 
(1 - jlx//, x0, xi, x2, . ..). then f : X -+ X is a norm continuous function and it 
can be easily seen that x # f (x)). Denote by B( f(x), //x-f (x)1//2) an open 
ball in m”,, centered at f(x) with radius jlx- f(x)ll/2. For each xe:;Y, let the 
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preference correspondence be P(x) = B(f(x), 11.x -f(x)lj/2) A X. Now, it 
can be easily checked that P has norm open lower and upper sections, is 
convex valued, and is irreflexive. Define the constraint correspondence 
A : X-+ 2x by A(x) =X. Observe that for all x E X, f(x) E P(x); i.e., P has 
no maximal element in X. Hence, there is no equilibrium in this one person 
abstract economy. 
Of course if there is no equilibrium in this one person economy we 
cannot expect an equilibrium to exist if the set of agents is an atomless 
measure space. The above example can be trivially modified to show this. 
Let (7’, z, p) be an atomless measure space of agents. Set X=X(t) for 
all t in T. For t E T and x~Lr(p, X), let P(t, x) = B(f(x(t)), j/x(t) - 
f(x(t))ll/2) n X and A(t, x)=X. As above one can easily see that f(x(t)) E 
P(t, x) n A( t, x) for all x E L,(fi, X) and all t in T; i.e., P has no maximal 
element in X. 
4. PROOF OF THE MAIN EXISTENCE THEOREM 
We begin by proving a lifting lemma which is crucial for the proof of our 
main existence theorem. 
MAIN LEMMA. Let Y be a separable Banach space and let X: T -+ 2’ be 
an integrably bounded, non-empty convex valued correspondence such that 
for all t E T, X(t) is a weakly compact subset of Y. Let 8: Tx L,(,u, X) -+ 2’ 
be a non-empty closed, convex valued correspondence such that 8( t, x) c X(t) 
for all (t, x) E T x L,(p, X), (!I( ., x) has a measurable graph for each 
XE L,(,u, X), andfor each t E T, 0(t, -): L,(,LL, X) + 2’ is USC in the sense that 
the set {XE L,(p, X): Q(t, x) c V} is weakly open in L,(u, X) for every norm 
open subset V of Y. Then the correspondence F: L,(,u, X) + 2L1Cp3x) defined 
by F(x) = {YE L,(u, X): for almost all t E T, y(t)Ee(t, x)} is USC in the 
sense that the set {x E L,(,n, X) : F(x) c V} is relatively weakly open in 
L,(u, X) for every relatively weakly open subset V of L,(u, X). 
Proof By Theorem 4.2 in Papageorgiou [17], L,(,u, X) as well as F(x), 
for each x E L1(p, X), endowed with the weak topology is compact. Since 
the weak topology of a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space 
is metrizable (Dunford and Schwartz [4, p. 434]), L,(,u, X) is a compact 
metrizable space. Thus, it suffices to show that if x and x, (n = 0, 1, . ..) 
belong to L,(P,~), {G> converges weakly to x, and V is a relatively 
weakly open subset of L,(p, X) containing F(x), then F(x,) c V for all suf- 
ficiently large n. For if U = {z E L, (p, X) : F(z) c V} is not relatively weakly 
open in L,(p, X), we can pick some XE U such that every neighborhood of 
x in the (relative) weak topology of L,(u, X) contains an Z& U. We thus 
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readily construct a sequence {x,,} converging weakly to x such t 
x,E&(~, X) and F(x,) d V. 
Let B and B denote the closed unit balls in Y and L,(p, Y), respective 
and let E > 0. It will suffice to show that for a suitable no, F(x,) c F(x) + 
for n > n,. This is because every weakly open neighborhood of the weakly 
compact set F(x) contains the norm neighborhood F(x) + ~8 for a suitable 
E > 0, as is easy to see. 
We begin by finding an n, that works. Since for each TV T, Qt. .) is use, 
we can find a minimal N, such that 
e(t, xn) c e(t, x) + -2-- B 
3/4(T) 
forall n>NN,. (4.1) 
Let a/3~( T) = 6 i . By assumption, for fixed x and IZ, the correspondences 
e( ., x): T-+ 2’ and e( ., x,) : T -+ 2’ have measurable graphs. Thus by t 
projection theorem (Castaing and Valadier [2; Theorem III.231) the set 
defined below belongs to z: 
Q =~wMk Y)E TX Y: (4 Y)E Ggt.,,,p (Ge~.,,,+,,J) ~7 
(where A” denotes the complement of the set A). Also note that 
Q=(t~T:e(t,x,) & e(t,X)S6,B)=(t~T:e(t,x,)/(e(t,x)+Cj~B)#~). 
This will enable us to conclude that N, is a measurable function of t. This is 
clearly so if we can show that 
(~ET:N,=IH)= n {tET:e(t,x,)ce(t,x)+6, 
nbm 
n{tET:e(t,XmpI) d e(t,X)+&,B). 
Let us prove the inclusion “c ,” leaving the opposite inclusion for the 
reader to verify. If N, = m, we then clearly have 
e(t, x,) c e(t, X) + 6,~ 
for all n > m. Were 
also true, we would clearly have N, d m - I. Thus Q(t, X, _ i) & 
e(t, x) + 6, B and the desired conclusion follows. 
We are now ready to choose n,. Since X( .) is integrably bounded, there 
exists ge L,(p) such that sup{ lIxII : xEX(t)) <g(t). Pick 6, such that if 
p(A) < 6, (A c T) then fA g(t) dt < s/3. Since N, is a measurable function of 
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t, we can choose n, such that /.A( {t E T: N, 2 n,}) < 6,. This is the desired 
no. 
Let n > no and y E F(x,). We shall show that y E F(x) + E& completing 
the proof of the lemma. 
Since e( -, x) has a measurable graph, there is a measurable selection 
zl: T-t Y, z,(t)EO(t, x) for almost all te T. 
The correspondence 
likewise has a measurable graph and by (4.1) is non-empty valued for 
tET,= {t:N,<n,). 
Thus there is a measurable function z2: T-t Y such that z*(t) E $(t) for 
almost all t E To. Finally set 
z(t) = zl(t) for t$T, and z(t) = zAt) for t E To. 
Then z(t) E 6( t, x) for almost all t and thus z E F(x). We shall now show 
that llz - y 11 < E, completing the proof. 
We have 
llz - Yll = IT,, Ilz,(t) - J4t)ll 4(t) + lTo Ilzz(t) - At)ll 44t) 
<2 s T\ To 
g(t) 44t) + jTo 61 &(t) 
<$+S,lr(T)=$+z 
3dT) 
.~(T)=E. 
The proof of the main lemma is now complete. 
Proof of the Main Existence Theorem. Define Ic,: T x L,(p, X) + 2’ by 
$(t, x) = con P(t, x). By Lemma 5.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar [23] for 
each t E T, tj(t, .) has weakly open lower sections, and it is relatively 
norm open valued in X(t). Define 4: TX L,(p, X) -+ 2’ by #(t, x) = 
A(t, x) n IC/(t, x). Then it can be easily checked that 4 is convex valued, has 
a non-empty interior in the relative norm topology of X(t), and for each 
t E T, d( t, .) has weakly open lower sections. Moreover by Theorem 111.40 
in Castaing and Valadier [2], 4 has a measurable graph. Let U= 
{(t,x)~TxL,(p,X): &t,x)#(20. For each xgL1(p,X), let U,={~ET: 
$(t,x)#@I)andforeachtET,let U’=(x~L~(~,X):#(t,x)#@).Bythe 
Caratheodory-type selection theorem there exists a function f: U--f Y such 
that f (t, x) E &( t, x) for all (t, x) E U, and for each x E L,(p, X), f( -, x) is 
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measurable on U, and for each t E T, f (t, .) is continuous 
6:T~L,(p,X)-t2~ by e(t,x)={f(t,x)) if (t,x)~U a 
cl A(t, x) if (t, x) $ U. 
It follows from Theorem 111.40 in Castaing and Valadier [2], that for 
each x E L,(p, X), the correspondence cl A( ., X) : T-+ 2 ’ has a measurable 
graph. Lemma 4.12 in Kim et al. [12], f(., .) is jointly measurable. 
Hence each x E L,(,u, X) the correspondence 0( ~, x) : T -+ 2 ’ has a 
measurable graph. Notice that since for each t E 7’, d(t, .) has weakly open 
lower sections, for each t E T, the set U’ is weakly open in k, (pS X). Con- 
sequently, by Lemma 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar [237, for each k E 7’? 
Qt, .): e,(p, X) + 2” is USC in the sense that the set (XC k,(p, X): 
Qt, x) c V> is weakly open in L1+, X) for every norm open subset V of X 
Moreover, 6 is convex and non-empty valued. Define F: L,(p, X) -+ 2L1(li.X) 
by F(X) = { y E L,(p, X): for almost all t in T, y(t) E 0(t, x)>. Since for each 
XE L,(,u, X), 1!9( ., x) has a measurable graph, F is non-empty valued as a 
consequence of the Aumann measurable selection theorem. Since 0 is con- 
vex valued, so is F. By the main lemma, F is weakly USC. F~rt~ermore~ 
since X(.) is integrably bounded and has a measur ble graph, Lr(p, X) is 
non-empty by the Aumann measurable selection t orem, and obviously 
it is convex since X( .) is so. Therefore, by the Fan fixed point theorem 
(-Fan [S, Theorem I]), there exists x* E L,(p, X) such that x* E F(x*). It 
can now be easily checked that the fixed point is by construction an 
equilibrium for r. This completes the proof of the main existence t~eo~cm. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The paper was written during the stay of the first and third authors at the University of 
Minnesota. We would like to thank M. Ah Khan for useful suggestions and discussions. 
REFERENCES 
1. R. J. AUMANN, Measurable utility and the measurable choice theorem, in “La Decision,” 
pp. 15-26, CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, 1967. 
2. C. CASTAING AND M. VALADIER, “Convex Analysis and Measurable Multifunctions,” 
Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Vol. 580, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1977. 
3. G. DEBREU, A social equilibrium existence theorem, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 38 (19521, 
886893. 
4. N. DUNFORD AND J. T. SCHWARTZ, “Linear Operators: Part I,” Wiley, New York, 1966. 
5. K. FAN, Fixed points and minimax theorems in focally convex spaces, Proc. Nati. Acad. 
Sci. USA 38 (1952), 121-126. 
6. M. ALI KHAN, On extensions of the Cournot-Nash theorem, in “Advances in Equilibrium 
Theory,” (C. D. Aliprantis et al., Eds.), Springer-Verlag, New York, 1985. 
7. M. ALI KHAN, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games over a non-reflexive Banach space, 
J. Approx. Theory 43 (19851, 37G376. 
266 KIM, PRIKRY, AND YANNELIS 
8. M. ALI KHAN, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games over a Banach space, Trans. Amer. 
Math. Sac. 29 (1986), 131-140. 
9. M. ALI KHAN AND R. VOHRA, Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered 
references and with a measure space of agents, J. Math. Economics 13 (1984), 133-142. 
10. M. ALI KHAN AND N. S. PAPAGEORGIOU, “On Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Generalized 
Quantitative Games with a Continuum of Players,” Proc. Amer. Math. Sot. 100 (1987), 
a-510. 
il. T. KIM, K. PRIKRY, AND N. C. YANNELIS, “On a Carathtodory-Type Selection Theorem,” 
J. Math. Anal. Appl. 135 (1988), 664-670. 
12. T. KIM, K. PRIKRY, AND N. C. YANNELIS, Carathtodory-type selections and random fixed 
point theorems, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 122 (1987) 393407. 
13. A. KOLMOGOROV AND S. FOMIN, “Introductory Real Analysis,” Dover New York, 1970. 
14. A. MAS-COLELL, An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive 
preferences, J. Math. Economics 1 (1974), 237-246. 
15. A. MAS-COLELL, On a theorem of Schmeidler, J. Math. Economics 13 (1984), 201-206. 
16. J. F. NASH, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. 54 (1951) 286-295. 
17. N. PAPAGEORGIOU, Representation of set valued operators, Trans. Amer. Math. Sot. 292 
(1985), 557-572. 
18. H. ROYDEN, “Real Analysis,” MacMillan, New York, 1968. 
19. D. SCHMEIDLER, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 7 (1973), 295-300. 
20. W. SHAFER AND H. SONNENSCHEIN, Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered 
preferences, J. Math. Economics 2 (1975), 345-348. 
21. S. TOUSSAINT, On the existence of equilibrium with infinitely many commodities and 
without ordered preferences, J. Economic Theory 33 (1984), 988115. 
22. N. C. YANNELIS, Equilibria in non-cooperative models of competition, J. Economic Theory 
41 (1987), 96111. 
23. N. C. YANNELIS AND N. D. PRABHAKAR, Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in 
linear topological spaces, J. Math. Economics 12 (1983), 233-245. 
24. N. C. YANNELIS AND N. D. PRABHAKAR, “Equilibrium in Abstract Economies with an 
Infinite Number of Agents, an Infinite Number of Commodities and without Ordered 
Preferences,” University of Minnesota, 1983. 
